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Introduction 
 
Thousands of depositors crowd in the door of a bank branch. "Where is our money? ", 
they shout enraged. "We want our money back! " The scene, beside forming a part of 
the classic movie " It’s a wonderful life " (Frank Capra, 1946) reflects a reality that 
many people believed distant but that has re-arisen strongly in the last years. We speak 
about bank runs. 
 
When one thinks about the economic crises, it is not complicated to associate them to 
bank runs. Bernanke (1983), in fact, argues that these were the cause of the major 
economic losses that took place in the time of the Great Depression during the decade of 
1930. More recently, many experts have spoken about the massive withdrawals of 
deposits in September 2007 in the British bank Northern Rock as the event that was 
announcing what has ended being known as the Great Recession (2008-2015). Be it true 
or not that the event in Northern Rock marked the beginning of the current crisis, the 
massive withdrawals in this bank illustrate that bank runs, as well as the financial crises, 
are neither events of the past nor isolated phenomena, but they take place nowadays in 
advanced economies. In this same way, many countries have suffered similar problems 
during the past years. It is the case of the Bank of East Asia, of Bankia in Spain, or that 
of American entities as Mutual Washington, Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers, in all 
them sudden money withdrawals of massive form have occurred during the last 
financial crisis. 
 
Our aim in this chapter is to speak about financial crises. Our intention is to 
complement the discussion in Chapter 14 on Experimental Finance, where the reader 
could familiarize with the problem of bubbles and market risks, but with a different 
approach. In this chapter we will study the behavior of the depositors and investors 
during a financial crisis and will analyze (theoretically and experimentally) what can 
lead  a depositor to withdraw his money in moments of crisis. In addition, we will 
discuss the literature on informational cascades and will see the mechanisms that may 
lead to the contagion of panic. In this sense, knowing how information is transmitted 
plays a key role, since there is no doubt we live in a globalized world, where both 
depositors and investors have information on anything that is happening. Our chapter 
will analyze, therefore if there is an effect, and how it takes place, in observing what 
others have done from an individual point of view (will I be going to withdraw my 
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money if I see that others are doing it?), as well as from a more global point of view 
(will it affect the depositors and the investors to know what is happening in a bank 
nearby or in a similar fund?). 
 
Before beginning, we would like to point to three things. The first is that we will center 
our discussion on bank runs, even though the reasoning and the analysis that we will 
carry out can be extended to different financial areas. In fact, many of the studies that 
we are going to analyze argue that their findings are extensible to other markets and 
institutions that also fail during financial crises such as investment and pension funds, 
the repo market, markets of interbank loans or the stock market. That is why massive 
withdrawals of money, information transmission and contagion problems can all take 
place in these contexts, even affecting the economic stability of nations.1 Secondly, 
though the topic that we treat could seem to be eminently practical, it is our intention to 
briefly introduce some theoretical notions that clarify the problems at hand. To do so, 
we will discuss some theoretical predictions of bank runs models and herd behavior 
models, before presenting the experimental evidence. The presence of a significant 
amount of experiments is, in fact, the third point that we would like to indicate. Though 
we have some intuition of how withdrawals may affect other depositors, observing this 
in real life it is certainly complicated. As we already know through this book, 
experiments can be very useful to separate different reasons and motives that influence 
behavior, turning out to be specially useful in such financial environment, given that in 
times of real crises it is impossible to observe and to separate all the aspects that can 
affect the behavior of the depositors. Do they all go to withdraw their deposits because 
they need the money, because of the information they receive, or because of what they 
see others do? To what extent do these explanations complement each other the way in 
which some tools (e.g. the existence of depositors with private information or the 
deposit insurance) mitigate the withdrawals?2  
 
In the following section we will define what is a bank run, by means of an example, and 
will see the first theoretical explanations of the problem. In section 3 we study how 
experimental economics has analyzed the way the agents' behavior during the financial 
crises affects the availability of information on what is taking place. Concretely, we will 
see how it affects the coordination of the choices agents make to update their beliefs on 
what the others are doing. Subsequently, we will see how agents update their ideas 
about the bank's situation or about the available investments, so that herds form and 
determine its behavior. Finally, we will study how what happens on the market of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A recent example in this global context that the reader can think about is the Greek case, where many depositors 
decided to withdraw their deposits out of the country at the beginning of 2015 after the arrival the power of Alexis 
Tsipras, leader of the Radical Left Coalition (SYRIZA). Such financial instability in different countries, in fact, 
motivates the study of Trevino (2013) that we will discuss below, analyzing how the holders of bonds of a country 
can decide to withdraw their money out of the country. 2	   The interested reader can extend his vision of the financial crises with other recent reviews of the literature, with a 
slightly different approach to ours: Heinemann (2012) surveys a wide catalogue of financial problems, including 
bubbles and herds, and as Duffy (2014), surveys the first experiments on bank runs; and Dufwenberg (2014) surveys 
experiments on banking, including also bank runs.	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asset or in a bank affects the rest, so that financial problems become contagious. In all 
these cases, recent experimental studies have been able to determine the underlying 
mechanisms. Finally, in the conclusion we briefly revise the above-mentioned results 
and suggest open questions that can be explored in further research.  
 
Why are there bank runs? 
 
Though the concept of bank runs will be made clear as we advance along this section, 
for now we can identify it with the scene opening this chapter: thousands of depositors 
come in mass to withdraw the money that they have deposited in their bank. The 
question is, what triggers such behavior in the depositors? Why do they massively come 
to the bank to withdraw their money? 
 
The literature gives two polar explanations. The first one is related to the health and 
functioning of the economy, of the bank system and of the bank itself. This is known as 
bank runs for problems of the fundamentals. The second reason to explain bank runs is 
associated to coordination problems between the depositors. Below we introduce a 
simple illustration that should help the reader to well-identify both explanations. 
 
Coordination problems and problems of the fundamentals: A simple example 
 
Let's imagine that you live in an island and that some time ago you invested, together 
with other 4 friends, a certain amount of money into a company. Each friend 
contributed 100 Euros, thus the company's initial capital was 500 Euros. Recently, the 
company has decided to carry out a project of great profitability. The idea consists of 
investing 250 Euros in the purchase of cattle in nearby islands, to then selling its meat 
in their island, which has very poor production of meat. To this end, you and your 
friends chartered a boat a few days ago, for 50 Euros. It is known that when the ship 
returns, the shipment of meat will be sold without difficulty in the island up to 
quintupling its value. The benefit from selling the meat will be, therefore, 1000 Euros 
(250 x 5 - 250). 
 
After chartering the ship and acquiring the meat, the company has spent 300 Euros, so it 
still has 200 Euros to finance the return of the shipment, which would cost 50 Euros 
(the same price each way). You and your friends know that once the ship returns to the 
island, each one will not only receive his initial investment but also the part 
corresponding from selling the meat. In total, this would imply that you could receive 
230 Euros. This amount corresponds to your share of net profits (a fifth of 1000 Euros), 
after adding your share for the money that has not been invested in financing the 
expedition (a fifth of 150 Euros). To receive your earnings, you and your friends only 
need to wait for the ship to return with the shipment. However, you signed with the 
company a contract against unforeseen events, which gives you the possibility of 
coming to the company and asking for the immediate return of your money. In gratitude 
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for having participated, the company will give you your initial 100 Euros, and also a 
small amount equal to 10 Euros as interests. 
 
In these circumstances both you and your friends have two options: 
 
• You can wait together with all your friends and receive 230 Euros when the ship 
returns;  
• You can go immediately to the company and ask for the reimbursement of your 
110 Euros. 
 
In this context, if a person decides to withdraw his funds, he will receive his 110 Euros, 
and those who wait will obtain a benefit of 260 Euros.3 But what would happen if two 
of them go and withdraw their investments before the ship returns with the shipment? 
The company has promised 110 Euros to each of them, but it has only 200 Euros.4 
Facing such situation, the company can give 110 Euros to the first who comes to 
withdraw his money and 90 Euros to the second one, or it can return 100 Euros to each 
of them.5 The only certain thing is that it cannot pay 110 Euros to each of them and that, 
regardless what the solution is, it would have important consequences upon those who 
have chosen not to withdraw their money: since the company will have to face two 
immediate payments, it will not be able to finance the return of the shipment. Thus, the 
purchased meat will rot in the nearby islands without it being sold, and all those have 
chosen to wait for the ship would lose their investment and would not receive anything. 
 
Though it could seem strange, the functioning of the banking system has much that to 
do with the simple example we have just discussed. The banks invest their money in 
projects that turn out to be profitable for its investors, but the investors must wait for a 
certain period of time until the assets are mature. What happens if many investors 
demand their money in the short term? These projects will not be able to be carried out.  
Therefore, banks face a problem between the profitability in the long term and the 
demand of liquidity in the short term and, though its health is good, they can end up 
suffering massive withdrawals of money, still without there being what are known as 
problems of the fundamentals. These problems take place when the doubts cause the 
massive withdrawals are not doubts on the actions of the rest, but doubts on the viability 
of the business. For example, imagine that you think that the ship can sink, that a storm 
is approaching or that pirates can steal the shipment. Though these possibilities were 
low, would you decide to withdraw your money? And if you see that a friend has 
withdrawn his money, what would you do? Would you think that your friend has some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Let's see why: because now there are only 4 people to divide the net profits with for the sale of meat, each would 
receive 250 Euros. In addition, the company has 40 Euros after financing the return of the ship and paying the person 
who has withdrawn his money, thus it would get 10 additional Euros.	  
4 Because the company had 500 Euros, this is the amount it has after having bought the meat (250 Euros) and having 
financed the expedition (50 Euros). 
5 Notice that the difference between both cases is that depositors can be served in the order they come (110 Euros for 
the first one and 90 Euros for the second one), or it could be waited until they all have claimed their money before 
satisfying their demand. In the literature, the first alternative is known as sequential service constraint.  
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information about the shipment and that probably he has withdrawn his money because 
there are problems with it? All these situations would suppose problems with the 
capacity the company has to make the payments, for it could end up in a situation of 
insolvency. In our example, nevertheless, there is no uncertainty on the profitability of 
the project. It is known that all the depositors are going to receive 230 Euros if they 
decide to wait. The problem arises when some investor thinks that the others are going 
to withdraw their money, which induces him to fear for the profitability of his project. 
Like, in certain contexts, withdrawing can result in one receiving more than if choosing 
to wait, the depositors can end up coming to the bank for their deposits. As contained in 
the spirit of the phrase declared by J. P. Morgan, referring to the financial crisis: " If the 
people would only leave their money in the banks instead of withdrawing it ... 
everything would work out all right. " (See Bankers Calm; Sky Clearing. New York 
Times, October 26, 1907). In this context thus arises what is known as bank runs due to 
coordination problems. 
 
Coordination problems and problems of the fundamentals are the main explanations of 
why bank runs happen, even though it is true that these two explanations can also be 
combined. Next, we center the discussion on the problems of bank runs to introduce in 
more detail these two explanations and the main contributions made to the literature in 
this area. 
 
Bank runs due to problems of the fundamentals 
 
The emergence of economic problems in a country is directly linked to the solvency and 
the liquidity of the bank system. In consequence, the depositors can alter their beliefs on 
the solvency and liquidity of the bank system when facing a worsening of the level of 
GDP of an economy, a significant increase in the level of unemployment, an important 
decrease in the rate of growth, or a sudden decrease in the valuation of the companies' 
managers. Such instability or distrust can make the depositors end up coming to the 
bank to withdraw their deposits. Thus arises what is known as bank runs by problems of 
the fundamentals: panic caused by problems related to the health of the economy or of 
the bank system. 
 
The works of Gorton (1988) or Calomiris and Mason (2003) - among many other 
studies - are useful to better understand what can provoke this type of bank runs, and 
how can one react to them. Gorton (1988), for instance, supports quantitatively the 
hypothesis that the economic cycle explains the appearance of bank runs. Calomiris and 
Mason (2003) complement these findings by empirically studying how certain specific 
attributes of the bank system (e.g. geographical fragmentation) or the types of shocks (at 
a local or national level) could have affected the probability that the American banks 
failed during the years of the Great Depression (1930-1933). In their study, Calomiris 
and Mason analyze, in addition, which bank characteristics could have made them more 
inclined to fail, and discuss the determinants of contagion at the local level (a question 
we will return to at the end of this chapter). Their results show that the fundamentals 
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explain well why the banks failed, especially during the first part of the Great 
Depression. 
 
In real life, there is evidence supporting bank runs due to problems of the fundamentals. 
We can speak about the problem that recently took place in Bankia (the third biggest 
Spanish bank in number of deposits), which suffered massive withdrawals when it 
became public knowledge that there were some failures with accounts, or the massive 
withdrawal of deposits at the beginning of 2015 in Greece, after the change of 
government. These examples make evident that depositors are concerned with the 
health of the economy and of the financial institutions, and they can react to such 
instability or bad news by withdrawing their deposits. 
 
 
Though the works of Calomiris, Mason and Gorton represent very important 
contributions in this setting, their macroeconomic foundation separates them from the 
approach of this book, centered on experimental evidence.6 On this regard, Klos and 
Sträter (2013) have conducted experiments to study how different beliefs on the 
condition of the economy can affect the withdrawals of deposits. In their model, the 
depositors have a private and imprecise signal on the quality of the bank, following the 
theoretical line of global games by Morris and Shin (2003) and Goldstein and Pauzner 
(2005).7 
 
Klos and Sträter claim that the subjects tend to follow a threshold strategy, choosing to 
withdraw or to wait depending on the type of signal they obtain, and of whether such 
signal is above or below a certain value. In addition, they fit their evidence to a k-level 
model, putting in evidence that the depositors have bounded rationality at the moment 
of deciding. The experimental evidence in problems of contagion, which we will 
discuss below (e.g. Trevino 2013), supports the idea that the better the signal the agents 
receive on the fundamentals of their bank, the fewer the number of withdrawals taking 
place. 
 
Bank runs due to coordination problems  
 
Before we study bank runs due to coordination problems, it would be necessary to ask if 
these problems are important or not. As we have already mentioned, Calomiris and 
Mason find that the fundamentals can explain well why some banks failed during the 
Great Depression. The authors, nevertheless, have problems to explain a considerable 
part of the problems the banks had during the last stage of the Great Depression. Ennis 
(2003) cites some examples that have occurred in history and argues that although the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The reader interested in knowing more on bank runs due to problems of the fundamentals can see the review of the 
literature in Gorton and Winton (2003). 
7 The experiments we will discuss in detail when we speak about informational cascade models also propose beliefs 
on the fundamentals, assuming that each depositor has a signal on the health of the bank which he can use when 
making his decision.	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deterioration of the fundamentals could have been the most relevant factor, the 
explanation of bank runs due to coordination motives cannot be discarded as a possible 
explanation, which makes both of them seem relevant. More recent empirical analyses 
(see Davison and Ramirez, 2014; De Graeve and Karas, 2014) suggest that banks with 
weaker fundamentals are more inclined to suffer bank runs, but there is also evidence 
that banks with good fundamentals could experience massive withdrawals. Therefore, it 
is suitable to propose another route to explain the withdrawals; bank runs due to 
coordination problems. 
 
The depositors of a bank can choose to come in mass to withdraw their deposits, even in 
the absence of problems of the fundamentals, if they think that other depositors are 
going to do it. During the panic in the bank Northern Rock a depositor, when asked 
about her reasons to withdraw her money, replied: “It’s not that I disbelieve Northern 
Rock, but everyone is worried and I don’t want to be the last one in the queue. If 
everyone else does it, it becomes the right thing to do.”8   
 
The pioneering work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) models this decision on the 
withdrawal of deposits as coordination problem between the depositors who decide 
simultaneously, without knowing the decision of other depositors. In their model, 
Diamond and Dybvig show that there can be two types of equilibria. In one of them, the 
depositors (as it would happen in the example of the company that we have discussed 
above) will wait and leave their money deposited in the bank, with the expectation of 
receiving a greater benefit in the future. In the other equilibrium, however, a bank run 
will happen: the depositors will be afraid that other depositors would come to the bank 
to withdraw their money, so they will end up coming to withdraw as well. This happens 
because the model assumes that those who leave their money deposited will not receive 
anything if the bank ends up without funds; thus it is always better to withdraw if others 
do it than to deviate and wait alone.   
 
In the model of Diamond and Dybvig, it is assumed that there are three periods: the first 
period in which money is invested, the second one in which it is decided whether to 
wait or to withdraw, and the third one in which those depositors who have waited 
receive their earnings (those who withdraw their money, receive their earnings 
immediately). One of the major contributions of the model, and which supposes a 
fundamental difference with classic coordination problems that the reader has seen in 
Chapter 4 this book, lies on the introduction of two types of depositors, so called patient 
and impatient. What makes the difference between patients and  impatients are their 
preferences, given that the impatient ones will receive utility only if consuming in the 
first period, whereas the patient ones value consumption in both periods. 
 
In the model, there is a production technology that transforms any unit initially invested 
in a unit in the first period and in R> 1 units in the second period, which makes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ax6oy1MsuSXA&refer=home	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socially optimal solution that in which only the impatient ones withdraw in the first 
period, and the patient ones wait to receive their (greater) earnings in the second one.  
 
Multiple theoretical works have been developed after Diamond and Dybvig, showing 
how bank runs can take place in different environments. The basic experimental model 
to study bank runs á la Diamond and Dybvig consists in a coordination game (in the 
style of a stag hunt game) where there are players interested in coordinating (patients) 
and others not interested in doing so (impatient). For instance, Arifovic et al. (2013) 
propose a model following the above-mentioned tradition, where the probability that 
each of the equilibria occurs will depend on how of complicated it is to coordinate. The 
above-mentioned difficulty to coordinate depends on the proportion of patient 
depositors who must wait for it to be beneficial to wait.9 By means of experimental 
evidence and simulations, Arifovic et al. (2013) demonstrate that this parameter 
determines if either one or the other equilibrium would take place, even when the 
fundamentals of the economy are kept constant. Said differently, the more depositors 
are necessary for the payment in the last period to be greater than the payment for 
withdrawing immediately, the more bank runs will take place. 
 
Bank runs and information about the behavior of other depositors 
 
The essence of the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) constitutes the fundamental 
basis on which most of the later articles in the literature of bank runs are built. Though 
multiple researchers have used the model to relax some of its assumptions, or to study 
for example what happens if the bank incurs a cost of liquidation if it leaves the project 
where it invested the money initially, we can say that experimental economics has 
turned out to be tremendously useful to shed light on some aspects that are not easy to 
model: what happens when the depositors, instead of deciding simultaneously what they 
want to do with their money, make decisions sequentially. 
 
Most models of bank runs have traditionally chosen an approach of the problem in 
which agents simultaneously decide. However, the descriptions of bank runs (Sprague, 
1910; Wicker, 2001 and Northern Rock's case) and some empirical studies (e.g., Starr 
and Yilmaz, 2007) indicate that many depositors have information about what other 
depositors have chosen, and can react to this information at the moment of making their 
own choices (Iyer and Puri, 2012; Kelly and O Grada, 2000). The possibility of 
observing actions is obtained through many sources: the news on how other depositors 
are behaving, personal relations with friends who tell us what they have done with their 
deposits. To adequately discern how the behavior of the depositors is affected by the 
received information, experiments become essential, given that in real life it is very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In our example of the company, we have not introduced patient and impatient types for this would complicate in 
excess the illustration; but it is easy to see that just one person should withdraw before the ship returns (what we have 
denoted below as period 1) so that it is worth waiting. Notice that if two of them decide to withdraw their money 
from the company, they will receive part of their investments, whereas those who wait will not receive anything. If 
only one person withdraws (and gets 110 Euros), it is still beneficial for the rest to wait (and get 230 Euros) instead of 
withdrawing.	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complicated (if not impossible) to know if the withdrawals are or not affected by the 
type of information that the depositors possess. 
 
In their experimental study, Garratt and Keister (2009) form groups of 5 subjects, who 
have the opportunity to withdraw their deposits immediately or to wait. As in our 
example of the ship, the depositors maximize their earnings if they choose to wait (in 
their experiment, every subject gets $1.50 for every $1 deposited) but it is also possible 
to withdraw their money immediately. The bank is prepared to absorb two withdrawals 
(paying $1 to every depositor who withdraws immediately, and $1.50 to those who 
wait). If three depositors withdraw their money, they will receive $1 but those who wait 
will end up without money, and will not get anything. If there are more than three 
withdrawals, the bank has to liquidate its assets to face these demands: it would pay 
$0.60 to all those who have withdrawn; once more, those who wait do not receive 
anything. By slightly changing these payments, Garratt and Keister (2009) compare the 
case where the depositors have only one option to withdraw, with another in which they 
receive up to three options. In the second case, the subjects know before the opportunity 
to withdraw their deposits is offered to them, how many persons in their bank have 
come to withdraw. The authors show that information about what has happened can 
increase the probability of withdrawals and, therefore, the existence of bank runs. In 
addition, Garratt and Keister consider a treatment in which some subjects are forced to 
withdraw, so that when others observe what has happened in their bank they see 
withdrawals but do not know if these have been forced or not. This characteristic in 
their model rescues the idea of the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where there 
are impatient depositors who need their money urgently. In addition, the authors 
consider aggregate uncertainty by not informing about the number of group participants 
that will be forced to withdraw. Their findings demonstrate that this type of uncertainty 
is also key to explain bank runs due to coordination problems, given there is a greater 
probability of withdrawing when the aggregate liquidity demand is unknown (when it is 
known, bank runs are in fact rare). 
 
With the aim to understand better how the depositors react to the information they 
receive, Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2014a) conduct an experiment where 
the players form banks in triads. Two of the depositors of the bank are participants in 
the experiment, whereas the third depositor is simulated by the computer and has been 
programmed to always withdraw his money from the bank. The subjects know of the 
existence of the computer so there is no aggregate uncertainty on the number of forced 
withdrawals. In the experiment, decisions are sequential (each of three depositors knows 
his position in the line) and it is possible to observe what has happened depending on 
the assigned information network: in some cases the decisions are simultaneous; in 
other they are sequential and what has happened in the bank is known, and in other 
there is partial information (for example, the third depositor knows what the first one 
did, but the second one does not know it; or the second one knows that the third one 
will see his choice, but he does not know if the first one withdrew his money). 
Following the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) the subjects also know that both 
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of them want to maximize their payoffs, but a depositor at the beginning of the line may 
be tempted to withdraw his money if he thinks that the subject choosing after him, and 
whose decision he cannot observe, will do the same. The theoretical prediction in Kiss, 
Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2014a) demonstrates that if decisions are 
simultaneous (and every depositor decides without knowing what has happened in his 
bank), there is equilibrium multiplicity, as in the model of Diamond and Dybvig. 
However, if the depositors know that they are being observed and can observe what 
others have done, there is  only one equilibrium without bank runs. The reasoning 
behind it is simple. Any patient depositor who acts first is going to leave his money 
deposited to induce the other patient depositor to act in the same way. Following this 
argument, if the first depositor decides to withdraw, any patient depositor acting later 
should infer that the withdrawal is due to the impatient player (simulated by the 
computer), thus he should wait, even when observing a withdrawal. The subjects' 
behavior, nonetheless, does not seem to correspond with this theoretical prediction as it 
is shown in the figure below. The evidence demonstrates that patient subjects react by 
withdrawing on having observed withdrawals, even if this was not an equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.1. Graph based on Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2014) 
 
The relevance of this article comes from having demonstrated not only that subjects can 
run to withdrawing their money after observing what others have done, but also that 
they do it out of panic, even in situations where the theory predicts that no bank run 
should happen at all. These results are in line with the experimental evidence of 
Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009), who already mentioned the importance that sequential 
decision-making has on behavior during bank runs. In their case, nevertheless, both 
environments (sequential and simultaneous) produce the same prediction; something 
that does not happen in the model of Kiss et al. (2014a) where the possibility of 
observing what other depositors have decided should produce a unique equilibrium 
without bank runs. 
 
Other factors influencing the withdrawal of deposits 
 
Already we have seen that the difficulty to coordinate, the presence of impatient 
depositors, or the possibility of observing actions can affect, among many other factors, 
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the withdrawals of deposits. With the aim of studying what factors affect the dynamics 
and severity of bank runs, Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) consider different treatments 
where they vary not only the way in which the decisions are made (simultaneous or 
sequential), but also the type of information subjects have on the "quality" of the bank 
that determines, at the end, how of difficult it is to coordinate. The depositors know that 
the money they have invested is going to provide them a given profitability, and that the 
bank is prepared to assume a certain number of withdrawals, depending on its quality. 
The experiment demonstrates how uncertainty on the bank's quality, and how the 
presence of insiders (subjects with information about the profitability of the deposits) 
can influence the withdrawals of funds (concretely, the insiders make bank runs less 
frequent and that withdrawals are delayed in those settings where the depositors have 
various chances to withdraw their money). In addition, Schotter and Yorulmazer study 
how deposit insurances can affect the results, and find that even partial deposit 
insurance significantly reduces the rate of withdrawals. In this respect, Kiss, Rodriguez-
Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2012) re-emphasize on the importance of deposit insurances and 
on the possibility of observing past actions, by arguing that both aspects are imperfect 
substitutes (i.e., the optimal deposit insurance should depend on how the information 
network is, that is, on the type of information that the depositors may have).10 Davis and 
Reilly (mimeo) study how the behavior of the depositors should be influenced by the 
attitude the authority has (firm or indulgent) at the moment of suspending the payment 
to the depositors and renegotiating the terms of the agreements. Closely in line with the 
above-mentioned studies, the possibility of observing past actions and the attitude 
adopted by the authority they will influence the probability of bank runs. For example, 
observing previous decisions will debilitate the positive effect that a firm attitude has, 
reducing the occurrence of bank runs in case of indulgent attitudes. 
 
An interesting contribution trying to explain why withdrawals happen is that of Dijk 
(2014) who studies if situations of fear, in and of themselves, are really capable of 
producing bank runs. To do so, before the subjects face a game of bank runs, they are 
induced to different psychological situations. Dijk observes that in the treatment with 
induced fear (where subjects must remember and describe with some detail the event of 
their lives in which they experienced most fear) the incidence of withdrawals is 
significantly higher than in other treatments (in those where they are asked to describe 
their happiest event or, simply, any random event). This opens the door for the 
interpretation of bank runs due to fear. The question is, are bad news spread by the mass 
media during times of crisis a way of inducing fear and provoking more panic? We 
leave the reflection on this question to the reader. 
  
Herd behavior and financial markets 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These authors have also studied how the gender or the cognitive skills can influence subjects at the moment of 
withdrawing their deposits in such situations of panic (see Kiss et el. 2014b, 2015). 
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The possibility to observe actions can affect depositors but does not need to be related 
only to coordination problems. The sequencing of actions may also relate to problems 
of the fundamentals, as demonstrated by the theoretical analysis of Gu (2013). Gu 
analyses how observing what the other depositors do affects the beliefs of the following 
depositors concerning the state of their bank. In this context, it shows how processes of 
herds are generated. 
 
To observe what others do and to update our impression of an issue is something that 
happens in many areas of our day-to-day lives. Before buying a new television or 
changing our mobile phone, for example, we are in the habit of looking at the list of the 
most sold products. " If it is most sold, there must be a reason for it ", we tend to think. 
And it is curious but this is not only the reasoning we use when we want to buy an 
object for which we do not have information (how many times have we had to buy a 
gift for a friend and asked the salesman which the best selling product is?), but it also 
happens when we have certain information (though probably incomplete) about the 
product that we want to buy or the market that we are in. In general, we tend to assume 
that the majority possesses certain information that can be useful at the moment of 
deciding. 
 
A classic example is that of the restaurant in an unknown town. Let's imagine that we 
are visiting a tourist city and a friend has recommended a restaurant to us to have dinner 
at. Though our taste is not totally like that of our friend, we can consider his opinion to 
be useful information so we decide to go to the restaurant. But when we get to the door 
we see that the place is practically empty, though there is another place just to the side 
replete with people.	  On having looked at the menu, we see that the menu and the prices 
are very similar in both restaurants. How many of us would we leave the information 
we have aside (the advice of our friend) to follow what the see the majority is doing? 
How much weight should the decision of the majority hold when we offset it against 
our private information? 
 
These are the questions considered by the literature on herd behavior, referring to the 
tendency agents have to ignore their private information to follow the majority. In 
financial literature it has been suggested several times that the herd behavior might 
serve to explain the excessive volatility of prices (excess price volatility) in the financial 
markets and the fragility of the financial systems. Seeing many people buy an asset 
(stocks of a company) can make a person follow the herd and also buy one, even though 
that person has unfavorable information about the asset. 
 
Herd behavior and types of informational cascades 
 
The theory of herd behavior begins with the seminal studies of Abhijit Banerjee (1992) 
and Sushil Bikhchandani et al. (1992). In their models, the agents have private 
information about a good that they are interested in acquiring and must make their 
decisions in a sequential manner after observing what the other agents have done. The 
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authors demonstrate that in certain environments, after a finite number of decisions, the 
agents will end up making the same decisions that the predecessors made, ignoring their 
private information. This situation is known as informational cascades, and although on 
occasion they could lead the agents to making an incorrect decision (for example, to go 
to the inferior restaurant, to buy an article of low quality or to invest in an asset that 
does not have value), they turn out to be rational decisions from the individual's point of 
view, provided that the information given by the herd can be evaluated as more valuable 
by an individual than his own private information. 
 
In an informational cascade, the agent decides to ignore his private information and to 
follow the pattern established by the market. At first, we can distinguish three types of 
cascades depending on the behavior of the agent: 
 
1. Behavior of the herd (herding): The agents ignore their private information and 
follow the pattern established by the market. For example, after observing many 
purchases, an agent decides to also buy also the asset, regardless of his private 
information. 
2. Inconformity (contrarianism): In this case, the agents decide to ignore his 
private information to act in opposition to the pattern established by the market. 
For example, after observing many purchases, the agent decides to sell, and does 
so independently of his private information. 
3. Non-trade cascades: These occur when the agents decide to abstain from the 
exchange, so they decide to neither buy nor sell the asset, regardless of their 
private information. 
 
As we will see later, a key factor to determine if herd exist or not is the existence of an 
exchange price. In the example that we have provided of the restaurant, the exchange 
price is fixed, as the number of people that decide to go would not influence the price of 
the menu. In financial markets, however, the exchange price is affected by the decision 
of the agents to buy or sell the financial assets. In both contexts, the agent's decision to 
follow his signal or to behave in accordance with the herd will depend on the measure 
known as trade imbalance. This refers to the difference between the number of 
purchases and sales that have taken place before an agent makes a decision. In this way, 
when we speak about a trade imbalance in a market of 2, we want to say that there were 
two more purchases than sales prior to the decision of the agent (in the same way, an 
imbalance of-2 implies that the number of sales is great than number of purchases by 
two). 
 
Informational cascade models in financial markets: The importance of exchange prices 
 
To better understand the formation of informational cascades, let's consider the 
following model based on the work of Cipriani and Guarino (2005). Let's suppose that 
an asset exists that the agents can exchange with a market maker. The fundamental 
value of the assets (V) is a random variable, with two equally probable values: 0 or 100. 
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The agents make their decisions sequentially in an exogenously determined order, after 
finding out the exchange price. The agents also have a signal regarding the assets. This 
(private) signal is informative so that if the value of the assets is V = 100, the 
probability that the agent has the signal that indicates a value of 100 is 70 % (if the 
value of the assets is V = 0, there is a 70 % probability that the agent has received the 
signal that the value is 0). The agents begin with an initial amount of money K> 0, and 
the final payment will depend on the difference between the actual value of the assets 
(V) and the price at which it the asset has been bought or sold (Pt). Therefore, if an 
agent decides to buy it will receive V - Pt + K, obtaining Pt - V + K if it decides to sell 
(if his decision is to do nothing, then the agent will receive K). 
 
Agents not only have their private signal and price, but they also have information on 
the history of exchanges and of prices. The pioneer studies originating the literature of 
herd behavior (Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992) did not have a price 
mechanism reflecting previous decisions, thus price Pt was not affected by the decisions 
of the depositors (this is what happens in case of the restaurants). To capture this idea, 
Cipriani and Guarino (2005) study the case of fixed prices. 
 
Given the assets can take both values (0 and 100) with the same probability, the market 
maker fixes a price equal to the expected value (Pt = 50) in a context of fixed prices. 
The price does not change during the experiment, regardless of the decisions the agents 
make. Based on the logic derived from Bikhchandani et al. (1992) it is possible to 
demonstrate that in such an environment, an informational cascade can result after a 
trade imbalance, greater or equal to 2 or lower or equal to -2, is formed. To understand 
this result, imagine that the third agent in deciding observes that both previous agents 
have bought the assets (that is, there is a trade imbalance of 2). Also suppose that the 
third agent has a signal telling him that the value of the assets is 0. Should the agent 
follow his private signal and sell the assets for a price Pt = 50 or should he buy the 
assets, though his signal indicates that the price is zero? Notice that after observing two 
purchases, the third agent will deduce that the signals corresponding to both previous 
agents were of 100. Bearing in mind these inferred signals and his own private 
information, the agent might apply Bayes’ rule to deduce that the asset's expected value 
is 70.11 Provided that the exchange price is 50, the third agent should ignore his private 
signal and buy, thus beginning a cascade because the next agent (though he has a 
negative signal) will see that there were three previous purchases, and will end up 
buying as well. 
 
A characteristic of financial markets is that agents' decisions reflect on the assets' price. 
If many of them decide to purchase (to sell) assets, its price raises (falls). This idea 
appears in case of flexible prices, in which the market maker is not forced to keep the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 To observe this outcome we denote by (b, b, 0) the  information set indicating the first and second trader have 
bought (that is the reason for the two b's) and the third has received a signal that the assets is worth 0. Therefore, the 
asset's expected value is 𝐸(𝑉  |   𝑏, 𝑏, 0 = 100 ∗ Pr 𝑉 = 100  | 𝑏, 𝑏, 0 = !""∗!" !,!,! |  !!!"" ∗!" !!!""!""∗!" !,!,! |  !!!"" ∗!" !!!"" !!""∗!" !,!,! |  !!! ∗!" !!! = 70 
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same price in all periods, but he can update the price according to Bayes' rule, bearing 
in mind which have been the decisions made by the agents. Following the idea of Avery 
and Zemsky (1998) it can be shown that when the market maker establishes the price 
according to Bayes’ rule, agents will follow their private signal, and therefore 
informational cascades cannot take place. The intuition behind this result is quite 
evident. Since the market maker updates the market price using Bayes’ rule, the price 
contains all the information from the previous transactions. Therefore, a rational agent 
should act following his private signal, which has additional information on the value of 
the asset. Given this information is unknown to the market maker, the agent can 
capitalize on this informational advantage to benefit. 
 
If we return to the previous example, in which the third agent observes a trade 
imbalance of 2, and we use Bayes’ rule, we can calculate that the market price offered 
by the market maker will be 84.48 (not 50, as in the fixed price case). Since the agent 
has a private signal telling him that the value of the assets is 0, he will use this 
additional information (applying Bayes’ rule) to calculate that the asset's expected value 
is 70 and consequently what he must sell the asset. 
 
In the following figure, we represent the Bayesian updates. We begin on 50, the asset’s 
unconditional price. In the first period, after receiving a positive (negative) signal, the 
updated price using Bayes' rule will be 70 (30), thus the first agent should buy if the 
signal is good and sell if it is bad. This decision directly reveals the first agent's signal. 
In the second period, if the trader receives a different signal from the one received by 
the first agent, then the update gives a price equal to 50. If an identical signal to that of 
the first agent is received (which, as above-mentioned, can be inferred from the decision 
he has made), then the agent can be certain that the price is either 100 or 0. Therefore, 
we move towards the extremes. One could see that prices are located on a grid and 
opposite signals are cancelled. What really matters in these cases is the trade imbalance, 
that is, how many more purchases than sales have taken place. 
 
 
Figure 15.2. Bayesian updates in markets with fixed and flexible prices 
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In the fixed price case, if at some moment the number of purchases is higher than the 
number of sales by 2, in spite of receiving a negative signal, the price updated á la 
Bayes will be higher than the price established by the market maker (50). This 
motivates the agent to buy, affecting with his behavior all those who act after him. 
Using the same argument, a trade imbalance of -2 makes agents, who still have not 
made their choice; sell, independently of their private information. When the price is 
flexible, the market price after two purchases is 84.48. If the third agent receives a 
positive signal, he will buy because by apply Bayes' rule with his private information it 
will lead him to calculate an expected value of 92.7 for the assets (as above-mentioned, 
the third agent will sell if his signal is negative because his updated value will be 70, 
which is lower than the market price offered by the market creator, 84.48). 
 
Experimental evidence of herds in financial markets: fixed and flexible prices 
 
Empirically, it is difficult to test herd models, because there is no data on the private 
information of the agents. In addition, it is difficult to know if the agents react 
differently depending on whether the exchanged asset's price is fixed or flexible. This 
can be done in the laboratory, where subjects can receive private information on value 
of the asset and observe the history of exchanges. 
 
Cipriani and Guarino (2005) used 216 subjects to test differences in herd behavior 
depending on prices. Their experiment consisted of 10 rounds, in each of which 12 
subjects had to make their choices sequentially. Before every round, an experimenter 
would toss a coin to determine whether the value of the asset was going to be 0 or 100. 
The participants did not know the result of the tossed coin, but they received an 
informative signal. There were two bags in the experiment. One contained 30 blue 
tokens and 70 white tokens the other contained the opposite. The bags were identical. 
Each subject, when asked to make his choice, had to draw a token from the bags. If the 
coin toss resulted in heads (tails), the participant will draw a token from the first 
(second) bag, so that the color of the token was an informative signal on the asset's 
value in that round. 
 
Each participant, after privately observing the color of the token, was to return the token 
in the sack and to announce out loud if he wanted to buy, to sell or to not do anything 
with the assets. The price of exchange was determined by the asset's price, fixed on the 
board. Also, the decisions and prices that had taken place up to the date were registered 
on the board, so that participants were not only receiving their private signal, but they 
were also obtaining information about the history of transactions and prices. The 
experimenter depending on the treatment updated these prices.12 Remember that in the 
fixed price treatment the price is constant and equal to 50, while in the flexible price 
treatment it changes according to the decisions made. In the table below, adapted of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 At the end of every round, the realized asset's value was revealed and each subject received his earnings, paid once 
the experiment had finished. In this experiment, subjects could not lose money because in each round they received 
100 lire (the experimental currency) and the value of the asset was always between 0 and 100. 
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Cipriani and Guarino (2005), we see a summary of the participants' behavior in the 
different treatments.13  
 
 
Fixed Price Flexible Price 
Act against the private signal (herd) 52% 12% 
Do nothing 26% 42% 
Act according to the private signal 22% 46% 
Relevant periods 58 66 
Table 15.1. Table extracted from Cipriani and Guarino (2005). 
The relevant periods are those where it is possible for 
informational cascades to be produced, for the trade imbalance is 
at least 2 (or at most -2) and subjects receive a negative (positive) 
signal.  
 
The theory predicts informational cascades when the price is fixed, as long as the trade 
imbalance is at least 2 (in absolute value). Along the experiment there were 58 
opportunities for potential informational cascades to emerge. In 52% of the cases, 
informational cascades occurred, where subjects stopped following their private signal 
to act in line with the behavior of the majority. In this treatment, subjects decided to do 
nothing 26% of the cases, whereas 22% of the times they followed their private signal. 
As illustrated in the table, things were very different when the price was flexible. In this 
treatment, there was 66 periods in total where the trade imbalance was at least 2 and 
subjects received an opposite signal. An informational cascade was formed in only 12% 
of the cases, with subjects ignoring their own signal. In 42% of the cases, subjects 
decided to do nothing and in 46% of the cases they followed their private signal.   
 
These results are in line with the theoretical prediction, according to which we should 
not observe herds with flexible prices but only with fixed prices.14 In general, this 
directly highlights the importance that an asset's price has to aggregate or transmit the 
information different subjects has on the asset's value. 
 
Inconformism and no-trade cascades 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 To elaborate the table, only the last 7 rounds of the experiment have been considered, and the relevant cases in 
which (theoretically) it is possible to observe an informational cascade. That is, we focus on cases where the trade 
imbalance was at least 2 (or at most -2) and the subjects received a negative (positive) signal.	  
14 In the experiment, there was a third treatment (called "without history") used as control to better understand the 
effect history has. This treatment was identical to the flexible price treatment, but subjects could not observe the 
decisions made previously. In this treatment, only 24% of the subjects observing a trade imbalance of at least 2 
decided against their signal, indicating that it was not history what was behind the results in the flexible price 
treatment. In a last treatment (called of "endogenous price") the update of prices was not realized following Bayes' 
rule, but it was endogenously realized by some participants in the experiment, who were designated to do so (and 
who were competing between them). The results of the latter treatment are very similar to those obtained in the 
flexible price treatment.  	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A strange phenomenon observed by Cipriani and Guarino is that many subjects decided 
to do nothing although in theory this is never optimal. In the treatment with flexible 
price, in addition, the frequency of not doing anything increased with the absolute value 
of the trade imbalance. The higher the trade imbalance, the closest the price was to the 
extreme values (0 or 100), so that not doing anything can be understood as a response to 
the great risk implied by making the wrong choice. That is, when the market price is 
close to 100, the subjects were afraid that such price was probably given by mistake and 
that the real value of the asset was 0. 
 
Another phenomenon observed in the experiment was that of decisions "against the 
market ", which has been denoted as contrarian behavior. In the flexible price treatment 
there were 132 occasions where subjects could act as inconformists. They behaved this 
way 19% of the cases, 18% decided not to do anything and 63% followed their private 
signal. In cases of contrarian behavior the market was not able to correctly aggregate 
information. In the fixed price treatment, subjects never adopted the contrarian 
behavior. These results go in line with the observations in Drehman et al. (2005). In 
their Internet experiment the flexible price made it unlikely for herd behavior to appear, 
though there was evidence of contrarian behavior in these types of markets.    
 
Financial market professionals: External validity 
 
When speaking about experimental economics a problem of the external validity arises. 
Will we be able to extrapolate what we observe in the laboratory to the real world, 
where the environment is less controlled and generally much more complex? 
 
Though there is evidence suggesting that experimental subjects do not differ much from 
the rest of subjects in the population (Brañas et al. 2013), it is always good to contrast 
the evidence obtained in the laboratory against the decisions other subjects make, 
especially if the aim is to know how experts in financial markets behave. With this idea 
in mind, Drehman et al. (2005) study the behavior of 267 consultants of the company 
McKinsey to conclude that their decisions were not significantly different from those 
made other subjects of all kinds of backgrounds in a very similar experiment to that of 
Cipriani and Guarino (2005). In the environment of cascade formation, Alevy et al. 
(2007) study if there are behavioral differences between students and professionals of 
the Chicago Board of Trade. They find that the decisions students make are slightly 
more consistent with the theory (that is, they do not contradict what is predicted by a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium). However, the rate of cascades formed is not different 
between students and professionals, though professionals use their private information 
much more than the students do, which leads them to fewer wrong cascades. 
 
Cipriani and Guarino (2009) analyze the behavior of 32 professionals employed in 
financial institutions in London, to see if the results we have just discussed were robust 
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to this manipulation.15 Their results demonstrate that the professionals' behavior was not 
very different from that of students. Abstaining from trading kept arising as a relevant 
behavior and though the professionals had a low trend towards herd behavior, they 
tended to be less conformists than students. 
 
The connected economy: Contagion problems 
 
To this point we have studied what happens between participants in a specific market, 
or the depositors of a specific financial institution. But for instance, what would happen 
if Greece decides to leave the Euro? Would it affect to the rest of countries in the 
Eurozone? There is not doubt that the interdependency between agents and economic 
markets is one of the most relevant characteristics of the contemporary economies. One 
of the crucial aspects of the increasing globalization is the connection established 
between individuals, companies and countries connected across constant flows of trade 
and information. This causes phenomena to be rapidly transmitted from some 
individuals to others, from some zones to others. During the recent Great Recession we 
have experienced how problems in a certain country were rapidly propagating to 
neighboring countries, such as the bankruptcy of certain companies was transferred to 
different parts of the productive fabric, and how financial problems in a certain 
organizations made others, who were apparently robust, shake. In fact, the problems 
financial institutions suffered are regarded as one of the principal engines of the Great 
Recession. The initial trigger was the explosion of the sub-prime mortgages that, 
through toxic assets, unexpectedly flooded the financial system. The innumerable 
connections between banks caused problems to hop from one organization to another 
and one country to another. 
 
The characteristics and problems generated by the different connections between 
economic agents have recently kept economists busy. Some studies (for example, 
Babus, 2014) have showed how certain connection structures between banks can have 
different effects when financial problems arise. In general, a greater bank 
interconnection allows the banks to have more diverse financing and investments, 
though a strong interconnection can make the bank system also more fragile against 
aggregate impacts. In such cost-benefit analysis it is fundamental to understand well 
which are the advantages provided by a certain network structure (Cabrales et al. 2014). 
Technically, this is a complex matter since the interactions between agents frequently 
leads to situations with multiple equilibria. Study what type of structures emerge and 
how different structures can affect outcomes is a question of interest from the 
experimental point of view. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In addition, Cipriani and Guarino studied the importance of informational uncertainty in the formation of herds, by 
introducing informed agents (with private information about the asset) and noise traders (who did not receive this 
information). In another study, Cipriani and Guarino (2008) studied the effect of transaction costs on the process of 
information aggregation by introducing a Tobin tax in the flexible price model. In this variation of their model, if an 
agent decided to buy or to sell he had to pay a fixed amount (lump-sum).  	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In their attempt to answer some of these questions, Corbae and Duffy (2008) study a 
setting where individuals first propose to form connections between them to, 
afterwards, play a coordination game with their connected neighbors. The formation 
about connections can be interpreted as the decision banks make when they want to 
minimize their risks. Confirming their theoretical prediction, the authors observe that 
bilateral structures are most frequent in the experiment. In their model, these 
connections are the most efficient and the ones allowing minimizing the changes of 
contagion. 
 
Contagion problems are also the aim of study in two recent works, where Brown, 
Trautmann and Vlahu (2014) as well as Chakravarty, Fonseca and Kaplan (2014), 
explore how the existing problems in a bank can affect the depositors of another bank. 
In both cases, the structure is given. The depositors of a bank observe what the 
depositors of another bank have decided, where both bank may or may not be linked. If 
I hear the news that a bank has suffered problems, will this lead me to thinking that my 
bank could also have these problems and to withdraw my deposits from it? Both studies 
find that such contagion takes place when the banks are linked. That is, when the 
situation of another bank (good or bad) can be indicative of the situation of my bank, 
observing the problems in the other bank will lead the depositors to withdrawing their 
money. Though one could expect this to happen, Chakravarty and his co-authors also 
find that even if the depositors are fully aware that both banks are completely 
independent, observing problems in the neighboring bank can provoke that the 
depositors of the unrelated bank also run for their deposits. Let's see in more detail how 
these studies are conducted. 
 
Brown, Trautmann and Vlahu study pairs of banks, each formed by two depositors. In 
each bank, depositors participate in every period in a bank run game, such that if both 
depositors wait, they get a high payment; if both withdraw they get a low payment; but 
if only one of them withdraws, he receives an intermediate payment and the depositor 
who waits does not receive anything (the bank ends up without funds). The banks can 
be in a good or a bad situation, characterized by a greater or a smaller payment in case 
both depositors choose to wait until the end. To study the possibilities of contagion, 
three experimental treatments were conducted. In the control group, the depositors of 
the second bank made their choices without knowing if their bank was in a good or a 
bad situation, and without knowing what had happened in the other bank. In the 
treatment with link between banks, the depositors of the last bank also ignored if their 
bank had good or bad fundamentals, though they decided what to do after observing 
what had happened in the first bank, knowing that the fundamentals of their bank were 
the same that those of the first bank. Finally, in the treatment with no link between 
banks, the depositors of the last bank to decide ignored whether their bank had good or 
bad fundamentals and made their choices after observing what had happened in the first 
bank, knowing that the fundamentals of their bank were completely independent from 
those of the first bank. To elicit information about the beliefs of the depositors, Brown 
and his co-authors used a 7-point Likert scale, to ask each depositor how likely or 
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unlikely was for them that their bank had good fundamentals, and whether they thought 
that the other depositors in the bank were to withdraw their deposits or not. Through 
this, the authors were able to identify the mechanisms through which panic becomes 
contagious between banks.  
 
The results of Brown and his co-authors show that when there is a link between the 
banks (they share fundamentals), the depositors, after observing withdrawals in the first 
bank, assign a higher probability both to the idea that the fundamentals of their bank 
must be bad, and to the expectation that the other depositor in the bank will withdraw 
her deposits. This shows that both routes of contagion, due to beliefs in the 
fundamentals and due to coordination, take place in linked banks. Another relevant 
finding is that when the banks were not linked, contagion was not observed, provided 
that the withdrawals and beliefs were not different from the control group. 
 
Chakravarty, Fonseca and Kaplan, studied banks formed by ten individuals, who choose 
for 30 rounds whether to withdraw their money or to wait. In their model, half of the 
depositors were assigned to the impatient role, and they had a greater payment if they 
withdrew their money, whereas the other half were patient, and had a greater payment if 
a sufficient number of them decided to wait. The fundamentals of the bank could be 
good or bad. In case they were good, the payment for the patient depositors was higher 
if they waited even if other two patient depositors were to withdraw (out of 5). If they 
were bad ones, once a patient depositor withdrew his money, it was best for each 
participant to withdraw. 
 
After the depositors in one of the banks made their choices (they knew the condition of 
their bank), the depositors of the other bank were to decide, after observing what had 
happened in the first one. Though they were not informed about the real condition of 
their bank, they did know that the fundamentals were good in each round with 80% 
probability. To understand the cause of contagion, they conducted two treatments. In the 
first one, the fundamentals were linked, so that both banks were in the same situation 
(and this was known by all the depositors). In the treatment with independent 
fundamentals, the situation of each bank was independent. 
 
Chakravaty and his co-authors also find evidences for contagion. When it is observed 
that a bank run has happened in another bank, it increases the probability of withdrawals 
by the patient depositors. Though this happens to a greater extent when the 
fundamentals of both banks are connected, an increase in withdrawals is also observed 
when the depositors know that both banks are independent. This differs from the result 
found by Brown and his co-authors. 
 
The sequential decision-making in the experiment of Chakravarty, Fonseca and Kaplan 
allows them to also observe how bank run situations are extended over time. A relevant 
finding in this regard is that, though observing a bank run in the other bank increases 
the chances of a bank run by the depositors, observing that the bank run stops does not 
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stop the panic the depositors feel. That is, the contagion occurs in one direction, 
provoking panic, but there is no such thing as "anti-panic contagion". 
 
As a whole, these two works have been able to experimentally show that bank problems 
are contagious from some to others (it is not simply that the depositors respond to the 
same circumstances). A third recent study on contagions that complements very well the 
previous ones is that of Trevino (2013). In the above-mentioned work, the author 
explores the possible routes of contagion when it is not possible to accurately know 
what happens in another bank. In her model, Trevino considers the situations of 
sovereign debt holders in a country that depending on its real condition can end up 
suspending its payments or not. She suggests that another interpretation is that of bank 
runs. In her case, the bank or country can be in a good condition, in a bad condition or 
in a regular condition. The condition of the bank will determine whether it is best for a 
depositor to wait or to withdraw his money (when the condition of the bank is good, it is 
better to wait; when it is bad, the best thing is to withdraw; and if the bank is regular, it 
is best to withdraw if the depositor withdraws and to wait if the depositor waits). 
 
To study contagion, Trevino assumes there are two banks, whose fundamentals can be 
linked or not. There is an a priori idea on whether the fundamentals are good or bad, 
common for both. To the above-mentioned information, a private signal given to the 
depositors of each bank is added, about the condition of their bank. The richness of the 
model comes from the fact that after the depositors of the first bank make their choices, 
the depositors of the second bank receive imperfect information about what has been 
decided in the first bank, which can help them to infer the condition of the first bank. 
 
The experimental treatments used by Trevino to understand how contagions take place 
consist of varying how correlated (not at all, moderately, or perfectly) the fundamentals 
of both banks are, and how much the depositors of the second bank know (nothing, 
moderately, or perfectly) about the actions of the depositors of the first bank. 
 
In line with the explanation of withdrawals due to fundamentals, Trevino finds that the 
depositors of the first bank withdraw less the better the signal they receive is. With 
regard to contagion, Trevino seems to support the idea of Chakravarty and his co-
authors, finding that when withdrawals are observed in the other bank the probability 
for withdrawals increases, even when the individuals knew that the fundamentals from 
both banks were independent. An additional interesting discovery in case of Trevino is 
that this happens even when the depositors know that the information they receive on 
the bank run in the other bank need not be linked to their reality. That is, if they are 
informed of a bank run in the other bank, even when knowing that such information 
could be either true or false, this leads them to increasing their withdrawals. We can link 
these findings to the ones on psychological panic described by Dijk (2014). 
 
Conclusions 
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In this chapter, we have surveyed some of the most relevant experimental studies on 
financial crises, emphasizing on bank runs and on how different information availability 
affects the agents' behavior. The experimental studies have showed the existence of 
bank runs both due to problems of the fundamentals as due to coordination problems. In 
addition, they have shed light on the existing dynamic mechanisms they have, which 
had not been deeply addressed in the theoretical literature. In fact, several studies have 
shown when people can decide after knowing what others have chosen increases the 
probability of withdrawing compared to simultaneous situations, which leads to 
thinking that an important part of why bank runs happen depends a fundamentally 
dynamic component. Coordination failures between agents, which lead to situations of 
panic are much more credible when individuals observe what others do or when their 
decisions are made in repeated occasions; in addition, their chances increase in 
situations of fear, when nobody has additional information or when facing less firm 
monetary authorities. 
 
Observe what others do also leads to updating one's beliefs on the viability of the bank 
or the financial asset in which the agents take part. The experimental analyses have 
shown how herd behavior can emerge, which lead agents to make their decisions in 
similar ways between them, in spite of possessing different private information. In this 
respect, it has been shown that in situations like those of the financial deposits, where 
the expected payment is fixed, the emergence of herds is much more credible than in 
situations like those of other financial markets, in which the price of the asset is updated 
with the decisions of the agents. 
 
Finally, we have analyzed the recent studies on the contagion of financial crises. These 
experiments have shown that when bank runs arise in a certain bank or massive sales of 
debt take place in a certain country it affects the rest, so that the crisis is transmitted 
from some assets to others. One of the most relevant findings in these experiments is 
that the above-mentioned contagion happens when either banks or countries are in 
similar situations, but also when they are completely independent. That is, financial 
crises in a certain bank or asset increase the instability in the rest of the system, even in 
those banks or assets isolated from the one that triggered the problem. 
 
The experimental literature on financial crises is a relatively recent field and there are 
still many open questions. Most studies until now have focused on bank runs, but there 
are other markets where massive withdrawals of funds take place and they have not 
been experimentally studied, such as the case of the investment funds, the interbank 
market or the market of repos, among others. The study of sequential problems has 
revealed how influential is the information agents receive, but little is known about who 
starts these processes and how do they start. Finally, though some studies have revealed 
implications on what measures to take, there is still no a systematic study on the 
optimality of the different actions carried out by governments and central banks to stop 
these processes. All this opens the study of the financial crises, as a field in which there 
are still many questions to experiment with. 
  References 
 
Alevy, J. E., Haigh, M. S., & List, J. A. (2007). Information cascades: Evidence from a 
field experiment with financial market professionals. The Journal of Finance, 62(1), 
151-180. 
 
Allen, F., Gale, D., 1998. Optimal financial crises, Journal of Finance 53, 1245-1284 
 
Andolfatto, D., Nosal, E., Wallace, N., 2007. The role of independence in the Green-Lin 
Diamond-Dybvig Model. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 709-715. 
   
Arifovic, J. Jiang, J. H., Xu, Y., 2013. Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure 
coordination failures. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37,  2446-2465. 
   
Avery, C., & Zemsky, P. (1998). Multidimensional uncertainty and herd behavior in 
financial markets. American economic review, 724-748. 
 
Banerjee, A. V. (1992). A simple model of herd behavior. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 797-817. 
 
Bernanke, B. S., 1983. Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of 
the Great Depression. American Economic Review 73, 257-276. 
   
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, 
custom, and cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 
992-1026. 
 
Brown, M., Trautmann, S., Vlahu, R., 2012. Contagious Bank Runs: Experimental 
Evidence. University of St.Gallen, Working Paper on Finance  2012/7. 
 
  Calomiris, C., Mason, J., 2003. Fundamentals, panics and bank distress 
  during the depression. American Economic Review 93, 1615-47. 
   
  Calomiris, C., Gorton, G., 1991. The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, 
  Facts, and Bank Regulation. in Financial Markets and Financial Crises, R. 
  Glenn Hubbard, editor 
   
  Choi, S., Gale, D., Kariv, S., 2008. Sequential equilibrium in monotone 
  games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data. Journal of Economic 
  Theory 143, 302-330. 
   
  Choi, S., Gale, D., Kariv, S., Palfrey, P., 2011. Network architecture, 
  salience and coordination. Games and Economic Behavior 73, 76-90. 
 
Cipriani, M., & Guarino, A. (2005). Herd behavior in a laboratory financial market. 
American Economic Review, 1427-1443. 
 
Cipriani, M., & Guarino, A. (2008). Transaction costs and informational cascades in 
financial markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,68(3), 581-592. 
 
Cipriani, M., & Guarino, A. (2009). Herd behavior in financial markets: an experiment 
with financial market professionals. Journal of the European Economic Association, 
7(1), 206-233. 
   
  Diamond, D.W., Dybvig, P.H., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance and 
  liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401-419. 
   
Dijk, O., 2014. Bank Run Psychology. Radboud University Nijmege, mimeo.  
 
Drehmann, M., Oechssler, J., & Roider, A. (2005). Herding and Contrarian Behavior in 
Financial Markets: An Internet Experiment. American Economic Review, 95(5), 1403-
1426. 
 
 
Dufwenberg, M. 2014. Banking on Experiments?, mimeo. 
 
  Ennis, H.M., 2003. Economic fundamentals and bank runs. Federal Reserve Bank 
  of Richmond Economic Quarterly 89, 55-71. 
   
  Ennis, H.M., 2012. Strategic behavior in the tri-party repo market, mimeo. 
   
  Ennis, H. M., T. Keister, 2009. Run equilibria in the Green--Lin model of 
  financial intermediation. Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1996-2020. 
   
  Fischbacher, U., 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for readymade economic 
  experiments. Experimental Economics 10, 171-178 
 
  Garratt, R., Keister, T., 2009. Bank runs as coordination failures: An 
  experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71, 
  300-317. 
   
  Goldstein, I., Pauzner, A., 2005. Demand deposit contracts and the 
  probability of bank runs. The Journal of Finance 60, 1293-1328. 
   
  Gorton, G., 1988. Banking panics and business cycles. Oxford Economic Papers 
  40, 751-781 
   
  Gorton, G. and Metrick, A., 2011. Securitized banking and the run on repo, 
  Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.016 
   
  Gorton, G., Winton, A., 2003. Financial intermediation, in: G.M. 
  Constantinides, G.M., Harris, M., Stulz, R.M. (Eds), Handbook of the 
  Economics of Finance, Vol. 1A, North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 431-552. 
   
  Green, E.J., Lin, P., 2000. Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial 
  intermediation: What's missing?. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
  Quarterly Review 24, 3-13. 
   
  Green, E.J., Lin, P., 2003. Implementing efficient allocations in a model of 
  financial intermediation. Journal of Economic Theory 109, 1-23. 
   
  Gu, C., 2011. Herding and Bank Runs, Journal of Economic Theory 146, 
  163-188. 
   
  Ivashina, V. and Scharfstein, D., 2010. Bank lending during the financial 
  crisis of 2008. Journal of Financial Economics 97, 319-338. 
   
  Iyer, R., Puri, M., 2012. Understanding bank runs: The Importance of 
  depositor-bank relationships and networks. American Economic Review 102, 
  1414-1445. 
   
  Kelly, M., O Grada, C., 2000. Market contagion: Evidence from the panics of 
  1854 and 1857. American Economic Review 90, 1110-1124. 
  
Kiss, H. J., I. Rodriguez-Lara and A. Rosa-Garcia, 2012. On the effects of observability 
and deposit insurance on bank runs: An experimental study. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 44, 1651-1665. 
Kiss, H. J., I. Rodriguez-Lara and A. Rosa-Garcia, 2014a. Do social networks prevent 
or promote bank runs?.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 101 (2014), 
pp. 87-99. 
Kiss, H. J., I. Rodriguez-Lara and A. Rosa-Garcia, 2014b. Do Women Panic More than 
Men? An Experimental Analysis on Financial Decisions. Journal of Behavioral and 
Experimental Economics, Vol. 52, pages 40-51. 
 
Kiss, H. J., I. Rodriguez-Lara and A. Rosa-Garcia, 2015. Think Twice Before Running! 
Bank Runs and Cognitive Abilities" (joint with Kiss, H.J. and Rosa-García, A.) 
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (2015), in press. DOI: 
10.1016/j.socec.2015.01.006  
 
  Klos, A., Sträter, N., 2013. How strongly do players react to increased 
  risk sharing in an experimental bank run game? QBER Discussion Paper No. 
  6/2013. 
   
  Madies, P., 2006. An experimental exploration of self-fulfilling banking 
  panics: Their occurrence, persistence, and prevention. Journal of Business 
  79, 1831-1866. 
   
  Peck, J., Shell, K., 2003. Equilibrium bank runs. Journal of Political 
  Economy 111, 103-123. 
   
  Rosa-Garcia, A., Kiss, H.J., 2012. Coordination Structures. IVIE Working 
  Paper WP-AD 2012-12. 
   
  Schotter, A., Yorulmazer, T., 2009. On the dynamics and severity of bank 
  runs: An experimental study. Journal of Financial Intermediation 18, 
  217-241. 
   
  Sprague, O.M.W., 1910. History Of Crises Under The National Banking System. 
  Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
   
  Starr, M.A., Yilmaz, R., 2007. Bank runs in emerging-market economies: 
  Evidence from Turkey's special finance houses. Southern Economic Journal 73, 
  1112-1132. 
   
  Trautmann, S.T., Vlahu, R.E. (2013). Strategic loan defaults and 
  coordination: An experimental analysis. Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 
  747-760. 
 
 Trevino, I. (2013). Channels of Financial Contagion: Theory and Experiments, mimeo.  
 
  Wicker, E., 2001. The Banking Panics of the Great Depression. Cambridge 
  University Press. 
 
 
 
 
